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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIA£1 
Amici are a coalition of six civil and human 
rights groups committed to protecting the equal 
rights of transgender individuals. Amici have a 
particular interest in protecting the legal rights of 
transgender youth in schools. Amici submit this 
brief in support of Respondent Gavin Grimm. 
Amicus curiae GLBTQ Legal Advocates & 
Defenders ("GLAD") is a legal rights organization 
that seeks equal justice for all persons under the law 
regardless of their sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or HIV/AIDS status. The Transgender 
Rights Project of GLAD seeks to establish clear legal 
protections for the transgender community through 
public impact litigation and law reform. The 
project's work has long focused on ensuring that 
transgender men have equal access to all programs, 
facilities, and services generally available to other 
men and that transgender women similarly receive 
equal treatment to that accorded to other women, 
including ensuring that transgender people receive 
full and equal access to facilities separated on the 
basis of sex. See, e.g., Rosa v. Park West Bank, 214 
F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 
1 In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a), all parties 
have consented to the filing of this amicus brief, and copies of 
their written consent have been lodged or filed with the Clerk 
of the Court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for 
amici state that this brief was not authored, in whole or in 
part, by counsel to a party, and no monetary contribution to the 
preparation or submission of this brief was made by any person 
or entity other than amici or their counsel. 
~----------~-----------------
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2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Oct. 11, 2000); 
O'Donnahhain v. Comm'r, 134 T.C. 34 (T.C. 2010); 
Doe v. Reg'l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A. 3d 600 (Me. 2014). 
Amicus curiae National Center for Lesbian 
Rights ("NCLR") is a national non-profit legal 
organization dedicated to protecting and advancing 
the civil rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender people and their families through 
litigation, public policy advocacy, and public 
education. NCLR has a particular interest in 
promoting equal opportunity for transgender youth 
through its "Transgender Youth Project," which 
takes on precedent-setting cases to expand legal 
protections for youth, advocates for inclusive, 
affirming, and welcoming policies at all levels of 
government, and furthers equality through public 
education. 
Amicus curiae National Center for Transgender 
Equality (NCTE) is a national social justice 
organization founded in 2003 and devoted to 
advancing justice, opportunity and well-being for 
transgender people through education and advocacy 
on national issues. NCTE has worked with school 
districts and other state and local government 
agencies around the country for over a decade to 
develop fair and effective policies. 
Amicus curiae FORGE is a national transgender 
anti-violence organization, founded in 1994. Since 
2009, FORGE has been federally funded to provide 
direct serv1ces to transgender, gender non-
conforming and gender non-binary survivors of 
sexual assault. FORGE has a strong interest in 
3 
ensuring that transgender people are treated equally 
and that false, unsupported, and discriminatory 
rationales based on privacy and safety are not 
misused to justify discrimination against 
transgender people, including the many transgender 
individuals who have suffered sexual assault and 
other types of violence. 
Amicus curiae Transgender Law & Policy 
Institute (TLPI) is a non-profit organization 
dedicated to engaging in effective advocacy for 
transgender people in our society. TLPI brings 
experts and advocates together to work on law and 
policy initiatives designed to advance transgender 
equality. 
Amicus curiae Trans People of Color Coalition 
(TPOCC) envisions a world where trans people of 
color can live and work safely, where health and 
economic equity are basic rights, and we are 
celebrated for our visibility and leadership in our 
workplaces, homes, and communities. TPPOC has a 
strong interest in opposing laws and policies that 
stigmatize, isolate, and harm transgender people, 
including the many transgender people of color who 
live, work, and attend public schools. 
SUMMARYOFTHEARGUMENT 
Petitioner Gloucester County School Board (the 
"School Board") claims that privacy interests justify 
excluding transgender students from the restrooms 
used by other students. The School Board asserts, 
as did the dissenting judge below, that these 
interests are rooted in universally accepted norms, 
4 
constitutional protections, and the Court's 
suggestion in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 550 n.19 (1996), that a military school for men 
would need to alter its facilities in order to 
accommodate privacy interests when it began 
admitting women. The School Board also claims 
that these privacy interests were recognized by 
Congress at the time that it enacted Title IX. 
The Court should reject the School Board's claim 
that privacy interests justify its discriminatory 
policy for three reasons. First, there is no basis for 
this Court to create a new privacy right that justifies 
excluding transgender students from shared 
restrooms. Second, nothing in Title IX's text or 
regulations supports the School Board's claim that 
Congress created an unwritten privacy exception to 
Title IX. Finally, although not required by Title IX 
or its regulations, schools that wish to enhance 
students' privacy in restrooms can use readily 
available, non-discriminatory means to do so that do 
not violate Title IX. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SCHOOL BOARD'S PRIVACY 
ARGUMENT HAS NO LEGAL BASIS 
AND WOULD UNDERMINE WELL-
ESTABLISHED LAWS AND POLICIES. 
At its core, this is a straightforward sex 
discrimination case. Gavin is a boy who is 
transgender, and the School Board's policy treats 
him differently than other students for that sex-
based reason. J.A. 67-68. Gavin has been 
5 
diagnosed with gender dysphoria. J.A. 64-65. He 
has obtained medical treatment and undergone a 
medically supervised gender transition. J.A. 67. His 
school records, state-issued identification card, and 
birth certificate all reflect his male identity. J.A. 67. 
Gavin simply wishes to be treated the same as other 
boys at school. The School Board has refused to do 
so, going so far as to adopt an official policy, 
designed expressly for Gavin, that mandates that he 
be treated differently than all other students 
because he is transgender. See J.A. 69. That 
discriminatory treatment is based on sex, as 
virtually every court to consider the issue in the past 
ten years has concluded. See Pet. App. 34a-35a 
(collecting cases). 
To sidestep an otherwise straightforward Title IX 
violation, the School Board invokes legally and 
factually unsupported claims that its discrimination 
is justified by privacy interests. The School Board 
does not precisely define the contours of those 
interests, nor does it explain how they were 
purportedly invaded under the circumstances of this 
case, but nevertheless suggests that they require a 
rule that categorically excludes Gavin from the same 
restrooms used by other boys. In short, the School 
Board's asserted pnvacy justification 1s a 
smokescreen for bias based on "mere negative 
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which 
are properly cognizable." See City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 4 73 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). 
Like the defendants in a long line of 
discrimination cases that preceded this case, the 
School Board seeks to justify its discriminatory 
6 
behavior by invoking unsubstantiated stereotypes 
and fears. All of these concerns, however, ignore the 
factual record demonstrating that Gavin is a 
transgender boy. Equally troubling, they ignore the 
reality of transgender people's existence. And in 
presuming that the presence of a transgender boy in 
a space reserved exclusively for boys could violate 
other boys' privacy, the School Board demeans 
transgender individuals and consigns them to the 
kind of disparagement, unequal treatment, and 
indignity that Title IX sought to prevent. 
A. The School Board's Privacy Argument is 
Inconsistent with Decisional Law. 
The School Board's claim that excluding 
transgender students from shared restrooms is 
necessary to protect the privacy of other students 
has no footing in the law. In essence, the School 
Board asks the Court to recognize, as the dissenting 
judge below did, a new right to privacy that would 
require the exclusion of transgender students from 
shared restrooms. In support of his decision, the 
dissenting judge cited dicta from United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 n.19 (1996), and the 
"universally accepted concern for bodily privacy that 
is founded on the biological differences between the 
sexes." Pet. App. 51a-52a. Similarly, the School 
Board refers to the "settled expectations of privacy'' 
and suggests that these privacy norms are founded 
on the physiological differences between the sexes. 
Pet. Br. 5, 20-21, 35. 
These arguments have no legal merit. Contrary 
to the School Board's argument, neither this Court 
---- -- ---- ----------------
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nor other courts have recognized any privacy 
interest that would be implicated merely by sharing 
a public restroom with a transgender person. No 
court has held in any other context that a privacy 
right permits an exception to an anti-discrimination 
law based on asserted discomfort. For example, few 
would contend today that there exists a privacy right 
that would permit the exclusion from men's 
restrooms of gay or disabled men, or men who belong 
to a religious or ethnic minority. Such an exclusion, 
and its resulting injury and indignity, would be 
immediately recognizable as overt and unlawful 
discrimination. The same principle applies here. 
The possibility that some boys might feel 
uncomfortable with sharing a public restroom with a 
transgender boy underscores the importance of Title 
IX enforcement, rather than providing a basis to 
retreat from it. 
1. The constitutional right to privacy does not 
provide a basis to exclude a transgender boy 
from the boys' restroom. 
There is no doctrinal support for the School 
Board's argument that merely sharing a public 
restroom with a transgender person violates an 
established constitutional right to privacy. Instead, 
existing privacy law focuses on circumstances in 
which government action intrudes upon a person's 
privacy. In that context, courts have recognized that 
individuals have a constitutionally protected 
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in one's 
unclothed body. See, e.g., Doe v. Luzerne Cty., 660 
F.3d 169, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
constitutional right to privacy may be violated by 
8 
nonconsensual videotaping of an individual's 
partially exposed body by police department actors 
for training purposes); Brannum v. Overton Cty. 
Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(finding a privacy violation where a middle school's 
surveillance cameras recorded the plaintiff students 
in their undergarments while in the school locker 
room); Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 
598, 603 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing New Jersey v. T.L. 0., 
469 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1985)) (explaining that 
students have a privacy right that protects against 
unreasonable strip searches by school officials). As 
all of these courts have recognized, the constitutional 
right to privacy protects against invasions of privacy 
by the government. See, e.g., Luzerne Cty., 660 F.3d 
at 176, 179. 
Moreover, even in cases involving a government 
intrusion into an individual's privacy in a restroom, 
the Court has concluded that the "character of the 
intrusion" in shared restrooms may be "negligible." 
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 
658 (1995). In Vernonia, the Court addressed 
whether the random drug testing of student-athletes 
through monitored urinalysis is a violation of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 652-65. 
In addressing the "character of the intrusion" caused 
by a school official's monitoring of the collection of 
urine samples from students, the Court noted that 
the circumstances in which the samples were 
collected (male students at a urinal while fully 
clothed and visible from behind and female students 
in an enclosed stall) was "nearly identical to those 
typically encountered in public restrooms, which 
men, women, and especially school children use 
9 
daily." Id. at 658. The Court concluded, "[u]nder 
such conditions, the privacy interests compromised 
by the process of obtaining the urine sample are in 
our view negligible." Id. 
2. United States v. Virginia did not recognize or 
create a privacy right that justifies the 
exclusion of a transgender boy from the boys' 
restroom. 
The School Board relies on the Court's dicta in 
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550 n.19, for the proposition 
that sex discrimination laws are subject to and 
limited by individual privacy rights. Contrary to the 
School Board's argument, however, that decision did 
not recognize or create any such limitation. 
Although the parties in Virginia agreed, and the 
Court acknowledged, that minor adjustments would 
be necessary "to afford members of each sex privacy 
from the other sex," the Court rejected the idea that 
the need to make such adjustments justified the 
discriminatory exclusion of women. Id. at 550-51. 
Importantly, moreover, the Court in Virginia was 
focused on protecting rights of the excluded group-
there, women-in order to ensure their equal access 
to school. Virginia holds quite clearly that, with 
respect to sex discrimination, "a remedy must be 
crafted ... that will end [the] exclusion from a state-
supplied educational opportunity." Id. (emphasis 
added). Here, by contrast, the School Board does 
just the opposite-invoking the interests of the non-
excluded group of students (non-transgender boys) in 
order to justify excluding a transgender boy from the 
boys' restroom at his school. If anything, Virginia 
10 
counsels that the School Board must take whatever 
practical steps are necessary to ensure that Gavin 
has equal access to the boys' restrooms, not that the 
majority may assert a privacy right to exclude him 
from the restroom entirely. 
3. "Universally accepted" norms do not justify 
discrimination against an unpopular minority 
group. 
The Court should also be skeptical of appeals to 
supposedly "universally accepted" norms as a legal 
justification for the exclusion of or discrimination 
against an unpopular group of people. In the past, 
similar claims were invoked to justify discrimination 
against lesbians and gay men. See, e.g., Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 4 78 U.S. 186, 192, 196 (1986) (holding 
that "majority sentiments" about the immorality of 
gay people provided a sufficient basis for 
criminalizing private sexual conduct between 
consenting same-sex adults), overruled by Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
Over a century ago, such claims were also used to 
justify discrimination against women. See, e.g., 
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908) 
(upholding a law limiting the number of hours 
women could work based on the widely held belief 
that "woman has always been dependent upon 
man"); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) 
(Bradley, J., concurring) (defending a law that 
barred women from being attorneys on the ground 
that "the civil law, as well as nature herself, has 
always recognized a wide difference in the respective 
spheres and destinies of man and woman"). 
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Similar claims have also been used to justify 
discrimination against racial minorities. See, e.g., 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7- 8 (1967) (holding 
that a law barring interracial marriage could not be 
justified by longstanding social norms); Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545- 46 (1896) (holding that 
separation of the races is "universally recognized" as 
a legitimate exercise of state power). 
The danger in arguments that rely on 
purportedly "universally accepted" norms, as the 
Court has repeatedly acknowledged m other 
contexts, 1s that such norms may mask 
discrimination. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2602 (2015) ("If rights were defined by who 
exercised them in the past, then received practices 
could serve as their own continued justification and 
new groups could not invoke rights once denied."). 
Indeed, "times can blind us to certain truths and 
later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress." 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578- 79. 
B. The Widespread Practice of Permitting 
Trans gender People to Use the Same 
Restrooms as Others Confirms that Doing So 
Does Not Violate Others' Privacy. 
The School Board's argument is also belied by the 
wealth of experience showing that, across the 
country, transgender men use men's restrooms and 
transgender women use women's restrooms. This 
collective experience powerfully rebuts the School 
Board's unsupported claim that permitting 
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transgender persons to use public restrooms violates 
universally accepted social norms about privacy.2 
Across the country, universities and K-12 schools 
have adopted policies that permit transgender 
students to use the same restrooms as other 
students, consistent with their gender identity.3 
2 To support the claim that transgender people must be 
excluded from public restrooms, the amicus curiae brief 
submitted by the "Public Safety Experts" in support of the 
School Board attempts to cast certain instances of invasive, 
voyeuristic, and illegal conduct as evidence of the risks 
associated with permitting transgender people to use restrooms 
that match their identity. Public Safety Experts Am. Br., App. 
A. But none of those purported incidents involved a 
transgender person. 
3 See, e.g., Idaho School Adopts Gender Identity Bathrooms 
Policy, Idaho State Journal (Aug. 19, 2016), 
http :j /idahosta tej ournal. com/news/local/idaho-school-district-
adopts-gender-identity-bathrooms-policy/ article_ 09e85e89-
fld0-5b2e-ab2a-41ef84bOa87e.html (reporting school in central 
Idaho, like many others in the state, adopting trans-inclusive 
restroom policy); Curtis Tate et al., Here's r-fJJat Happens 
r-fJJen Schools Let Transgender Students Use the Bathroom 
They Want, Miami Herald (June 20, 2016), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
wor ld!nationall article84 797 527 .h tml (detailing stories of 
schools in Kentucky, Missouri, and Washington adopting trans-
inclusive bathroom policies without incident); Walker 
Orenstein, Transgender Bathroom Choice Nothing New for 
Seattle Schools, AP The Big Story (May 17, 2016), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ 
ca5d8f92a1 bf486da533a55260071599/transgender-bathroom-
choice-nothing-new-seattle-schools (noting gender-identity 
based restroom policies have existed in Seattle since 2012); 
Rachel Percelay, 17 School Districts Debunk Right- Jllilng Lies 
About Protections for Transgender Students, MediaMatters 
(June 3, 2015), http:/fmediamatters.org/research/2015/06/03/17-
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Among colleges, all Seven Sisters colleges admit 
transgender women and provide them access to 
school facilities on equal terms, including with 
regard to restrooms. 4 In addition, myriad 
organizations and institutions, including the United 
school-districts-debunk-right-wing-lies-abou/203867 (reporting 
school districts in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Sacramento 
have had gender identity restroom policies since at least 2013); 
Travis Anderson, Schools Get Guidelines on Transgender 
Students, Boston Globe (Feb. 17, 2013), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/02/17/transgender/FH 
mjiUlSZoOLCMy02xF97M/story.html (reporting new 
Massachusetts guidelines establishing the gender-identity 
based restroom policy); Colorado Civil Rights Commission and 
Division, 2009 Annual Report (Dec. 2009), 
www.cde.state.co.us/artemis/regserials/reg91internet!reg91200 
9internet.pdf (announcing rules outlining restroom separation 
based on gender). 
4 See, e.g., Barnard College, Transgender Admissions Policy & 
FAQ, https:/fbarnard.edu/admissions/transgender-policy Oast 
visited February 28, 2017); Bryn Mawr College, Transgender 
Applicants, https://www.brynmawr.edu/node/3620 (last visited 
February 28, 2017); Mount Holyoke College, Admission of 
Transgender Students, 
https:/ /www .mtholyoke.edu/policies/ admission -transgender-
students (last visited February 28, 2017); Smith College, 
Gender Identity & Expression, https://www.smith.edu/about-
smith/diversity/gender-identity-expression (last visited 
February 28, 2017); Wellesley College, Mission and Gender 
Policy, http://www.wellesley.edu/news/gender-
policy#OQ2oxu3BBsDUMZkt.97 (last visited February 28, 
2017); see also Susan Svrluga, Barnard will admit transgender 
students. Now all 'Seven Sisters' colleges do., Washington Post 




States Military, 5 the International Olympic 
Committee,6 the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, 7 the Girl Scouts, s and most recently, the 
Boy Scouts, 9 have fully integrated trans gender 
people into their organizations. And s1nce 
Minneapolis adopted the first transgender 
nondiscrimination law in 1975, eighteen states and 
the District of Columbia have enacted laws that 
5 See DOD! No 1300.28: In-Service Transition for Transgender 
Service Members, U.S. Department of Defense (June 30, 2016), 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2016/0616_policy/Do 
D·Instruction-1300.28.pdf. 
6 See International Olympic Committee, JOG Consensus 





drogenism -en. pdf. 
7 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, NCAA Inclusion of 
Transgender Student-Athletes (Aug. 2011), 
www .ncaa.org/sites/ default/files/Transgender_Handbook_20 11_ 
Final. pdf. 
s See Girl Scouts, Frequently Asked Questions: Social Issues, 
www.girlscouts.org/en/faq/faq/social-issues.html (last visited 
Feb. 23, 201 7) ("[I]f the child is recognized by the family and 
school/community as a girl and lives culturally as a girl, then 
Girl Scouts is an organization that can serve her in a setting 
that is both emotionally and physically safe."). 
9 See Editorial Board, Welcoming Transgender Scouts, N.Y. 




prohibit gender identity discrimination in places of 
public accommodation, including public restrooms.l0 
Similarly, major companies, including Accenture, 
Airbnb, American Airlines, Apple, Biogen Idee, 
Bloomberg, Boehinger Ingleheim USA, Box, Capital 
One, Cisco, Corning, Dropbox, E.I. dePont de 
Nemours & Company, eBay, Etsy, Expedia, the Gap, 
General Electric, Glassdoor, Hilton Worldwide, IBM, 
IKEA, John Hancock Financial, Levi Strauss, 
Linkedin, Marriott International, Microsoft, Morgan 
Stanley, Nike, Oppenheimer Capital Funds, Pay Pal, 
RBC Capital Markets LLC, TD Bank, the Dow 
Chemical Company, Thermo Fisher Scientific, 
United Airlines, Williams-Sonoma, and Yelp, among 
others, have all adopted non-discrimination policies 
that treat transgender employees equally in all 
respects, including access to the same restrooms 
used by others. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief by 68 
Companies Opposed to H.B.2 and In Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, United 
10 Cal. Educ. Code § 221.5(£) (Deering 2016); Cal. Civ. Code § 51 
(Deering 2016); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 118600 (Deering 
2017); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-34-301, 24-34-601 (2016); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 46a-64 (2016); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4504 (2013); 
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 489-3 (2016); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-102, 
5/1-103 (2016); Iowa Code§ 216.7(1)(a) (2016); Me. Stat. tit. 5, 
§§ 4592, 4553(9-C) (2017); Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 20-304 
(LexisNexis 2017); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 98 (2016); Minn. 
Stat. §§ 363A.ll, 363A.03(44) (2017); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.070 
(2016); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(£) (2017); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-
1-7(£) (2016); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 174.100, 659A.403 (2016); R.I. 
Gen. Laws § 11-24-2 (2016); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502 (2016); 
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 49.60.215, 49.60.040(26) (2016); D.C. Code 
§ 2-1402.31 (2017). 
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States v. North Carolina, No. 16-cv-00425 (M.D.N.C. 
July 8, 2016), ECF Nos. 85, 85-1. These policies 
acknowledge that the presence of transgender men 
in men's rooms or transgender women in women's 
rooms does not inherently violate any other users' 
privacy. Id. at 11. 
Were this Court to recognize a new privacy right 
guaranteeing that men do not have to share a 
restroom with a transgender man and that women 
do not have to share a restroom with a transgender 
woman, that ruling would invalidate all of these 
policies, practices, and laws, on which millions of 
people have come to rely. 
II. NOTHING IN TITLE IX'S TEXT OR 
REGULATIONS SUPPORTS THE 
ARGUMENT THAT ITS PROTECTIONS 
ARE LIMITED BY STUDENTS' PRIVACY 
INTERESTS. 
The School Board argues that Title IX's text and 
regulations prove that Congress intended to limit 
the statute's reach in order to protect personal 
privacy. Pet. Br. 7-9. That argument has no merit. 
The School Board ignores the plain language of 
Title IX's exceptions, which are narrow, permissive, 
and contain no mention of privacy. In addition, 
when interpreting Title IX's application to contact 
sports, courts across the country have consistently 
rejected arguments like those advanced by the 
School Board, holding that paternalistic allusions to 
privacy and safety cannot justify sex discrimination. 
17 
A. The Text of Title IX and Its Exceptions Shows 
That Title IX Is an Antidiscrimination 
Statute, Not a Privacy Statute. 
When seeking to discern a statute's purpose, 
courts start with the text. See, e.g., Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003). Title IX's 
stated purpose is combatting sex discrimination. See 
20 U.S.C. § 1681. Any interpretation of Title IX and 
its exceptions must remain consistent with that 
"dominating general purpose." See, e.g., SEC v. CM 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943). 
If, as the School Board contends, Congress sought to 
limit Title IX's prohibition on discrimination in 
certain areas to "preserve 'personal privacy'," Pet. 
Br. 32, there would be clear indication in the 
statutory text. Congress does not "alter the 
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme" in 
vague or uncertain terms. See Whitman v. 
American Trucking Assns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 
(2001). 
A plain reading of Title IX provides no evidence 
in support of the School Board's argument. The 
word "privacy" does not appear anywhere in the 
statute nor its implementing regulations. See 20 
U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq.; 34 C.F.R. § 106. Nothing in 
the text suggests or even hints that Title IX's 
promise of equal educational opportunities is limited 
by privacy interests. 
The School Board contends that the very 
existence of Title IX's "living spaces" exception 
proves that Congress recognized that exceptions 
were "needed to preserve privacy" in intimate 
---------
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facilities. Pet. Br. 7 (emphasis added). But the 
exception's permissive nature undercuts the School 
Board's argument. The living spaces exception does 
not require sex separation, but merely states that 
the statute does not "prohibit any educational 
institution ... from maintaining separate living 
facilities for the different sexes." 20 U.S.C. § 1686. 
In drafting this exception this way, Congress plainly 
contemplated the possibility of facilities not 
separated by sex. If Congress had a concern about 
this possibility, the living spaces exception would not 
be permissive. 
The School Board's attempt to read a privacy 
limitation into Title IX is particularly inappropriate 
given the enumeration of specific exceptions. See 20 
U.S.C. § 1681. As the Court has noted, "Title IX is a 
broadly written general prohibition on 
discrimination, followed by specific, narrow 
exceptions." Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 
544 U.S. 167, 175 (2005). While the statutory basis 
for the School Board's privacy argument is unclear, 
to the extent that the School Board seeks to read an 
additional exception for privacy into Title IX, that 
argument is precluded by Title IX's existing 
exceptions. See, e.g., Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 
446 U.S. 608, 616- 17 (1980) (noting that "[w]here 
Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to 
a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not 
to be implied"). 
If instead the School Board seeks to imbue Title 
IX's existing exceptions with a privacy interest, it 
gives those exceptions a weight and breadth far 
beyond the text of the statute. Title IX's exceptions 
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do nothing more than permit schools and 
organizations to choose to separate the sexes in 
certain limited, enumerated circumstances, such as 
the boy scouts, girl scouts, father-daughter dances, 
beauty pageants, and living facilities. 20 U.S.C. §§ 
1681, 1686. Providing schools with the flexibility to 
continue adhering to social conventions like father-
daughter dances does not insert a roving privacy 
exception into the statute, and certainly not one that 
would justify the otherwise unlawful exclusion of a 
member of a disfavored minority. 
B. Title IX's Contact Sports Exception Further 
Demonstrates That Congress Was Not 
Focused on Addressing Purported Safety or 
Privacy Issues Arising from Anatomical 
Differences. 
The School Board argues that Title IX's contact 
sports regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41, which permits 
sex-based separation in the context of contact sports, 
reflects Congress's acknowledgement that Title IX's 
anti-discrimination mandate is limited by privacy 
and safety interests "plainly grounded in 
physiology." Pet. Br. 40. This conclusion, however, 
ignores the regulation's history and decades of 
judicial interpretation. 
The legislative history of the contact sports 
regulation belies any suggestions that Congress and 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
("HEW') were addressing privacy or safety concerns. 
To the contrary, the only official justification 
provided by HEW for permitting sex-based 
separation in such sports was to provide students 
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with equal athletic opportunity. See Policy 
Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,414 (1979); 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education 
Programs Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 
40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975). 
If Congress and HEW had any other interests in 
mind, those interests were the universities' interests 
in revenue-producing sports, not students' purported 
safety or privacy interests. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,414 
(1979); 121 Cong. Rec. 20,913 (1975). In 1974, 
Senator Tower introduced an amendment that would 
have expressly exempted all revenue-producing 
athletics from Title IX, out of concern that co-ed 
teams would generate less revenue. 120 Cong. Rec. 
15,323 (1974). The amend~ent failed, but soon 
thereafter Congress directed HEW to create 
"reasonable provisions" governing athletics. See 40 
Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975). HEW developed a list of 
"contact sports" that included football and 
basketball, two sports that generate significant 
revenue for colleges. 120 Cong. Rec. 15,323 (1974). 
HEW did not, however, include other contact sports, 
like field hockey, soccer, and lacrosse, which 
traditionally generate less revenue for colleges and 
universities. 
The School Board's argument also ignores 
decades of judicial interpretation of the regulation. 
Before the regulation's promulgation, courts across 
the country consistently held that excluding girls 
from boys' sports teams on the basis of purported 
safety concerns constituted unconstitutional sex 
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discrimination.n As the Eighth Circuit pointed out 
in 1973, "discrimination on the basis of sex can no 
longer be justified by reliance on 'outdated images of 
women as peculiarly delicate and impressionable 
creatures in need of protection from the rough and 
tumble of unvarnished humanity."' Brenden, 4 77 
F.2d at 1296 (quoting Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old 
Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970)). Thus, if HEW had adopted the regulation 
out of concern for female students' safety or privacy, 
its regulation would have risked constitutional 
challenge. 
After 1975, courts continued to reject "safety 
concerns" as a basis for excluding women from 
contact sports teams. 12 In fact, many courts 
11 See, e.g., Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athle6c Ass:U, 
415 F. Supp. 569, 572 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (granting preliminary 
injunction permitting female student to try out for boys' 
baseball team); Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 
F.2d 344, 351 (1st Cir. 1975) (same); Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. 
Supp. 1396, 1400 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (same for football); Brenden 
v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1302 (8th Cir. 1973) (same 
for all non-contact sports); Reed v. Nebraska Sch. Activities 
Ass:U, 341 F. Supp. 258, 263 (D. Neb. 1972) (same for golf); see 
also Opinion of Justices to House of Representatives, 371 
N.E.2d 426, 430 (Mass. 1977) (counseling state legislature that 
a statute restricting girls' participation on boys' contact sports 
teams "serves no compelling State interest" and would be 
unconstitutional); Packel v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic 
Athletic Ass:U, 334 A.2d 839, 843 (Pa. 1975) (declaring state 
statute denying female athletes equal opportunity in sports 
denied equality under law). 
12 See, e.g., Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1505 (D. Kan. 
1996) (granting female student's motion for preliminary 
injunction against defendants denying her the opportunity to 
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characterized purported safety-based justifications 
as running directly counter to Title IX's purpose and 
mandate by perpetuating sex stereotypes. See, e.g., 
Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1504; Saint, 684 F. Supp. at 
629 ("Such a paternalistic gender-based 
classification, that is, one resulting from 'ascribing a 
particular trait or quality to one sex, when not all 
share that trait or quality,' is not only 'inherently 
unfair, but generally tends only to perpetuate 
'stereotypical notions' regarding the proper roles of 
men and women."' (quoting Force, 570 F. Supp. at 
participate in wrestling); Saint v. Nebraska Sch. Activities 
Ass'n, 684 F. Supp. 626, 630 (D. Neb. 1988) (issuing a 
temporary restraining order against a school activities 
association refusing to permit female student to wrestle on 
boys' wrestling team); Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663, 665 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (enjoining school officials from interfering with 
female student trying out for the all-male football team on the 
basis of assumptions about her strength and agility); Force v. 
Pierce City R-IT Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (W.D. Mo. 
1983) (granting preliminary injunction for 13-year-old female 
student seeking to try out for the eighth grade football team, 
explaining there is nothing in Title IX or the regulations that 
mandates her exclusion); Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic 
Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D. Wis. 1978) 
(enjoining state athletic association from barring female 
students from participating in interscholastic sports based on 
generalizations about girls' bodies and risk of injury); Hoover v. 
Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Colo. 1977) (striking 
down rule excluding female students from participating in any 
form of interscholastic soccer competition on the basis of "safety 
concerns"); see also Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts 
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d 284, 293-95 (Mass. 
1979) (denying safety arguments as a basis for excluding boys 
from girls' sports teams). 
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1029)). Indeed, amiCI are unaware of any case in 
which a court accepted "safety concerns" as a 
legitimate basis for sex-segregation in sports. 
Courts have also refused to countenance 
arguments that resemble "privacy concerns," focused 
on "moral objections" and beliefs regarding what is 
appropriate with respect to interactions between 
women and men. See Beattie v. Line Mt. Sch. Dist., 
992 F. Supp. 2d 384, 392 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Adams, 
919 F. Supp. at 1504 (rejecting "student and parent 
objections based on moral beliefs" as an "important 
governmental objective" justifying excluding girls 
from wrestling team). In Beattie, for example, the 
district court rejected the school's argument that the 
"lowering of students' inhibitions, desensitizing them 
and possibly impacting moral standards for all of 
those who participate in the sport" was a legitimate 
basis for excluding girls from boys' contact sports. 
992 F. Supp. 2d at 392. The court refused to 
sanction the view that discomfort with bodies of the 
opposite sex is a legitimate basis for separation or 
exclusion, writing "it is not the duty of the school to 
shield students from every situation which they may 
find objectionable or embarrassing due to their own 
prejudices." Id. at 394-95 (quoting Adams, 919 F. 
Supp. at 1504). 
The result should be the same here: unsupported 
safety and privacy interests are not legitimate 
justifications for the exclusion of a transgender boy 
from the boys' restrooms. As courts have repeatedly 
held in the contact sports context, purported 
justifications rooted m students' anatomical 
-------------------------------------------------
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differences or social norms simply cannot be squared 
with Title IX's text and its broad remedial purpose. 
III. SCHOOLS CAN USE NON-
DISCRIMINATORY MEANS TO 
ENHANCE STUDENT'S PRIVACY 
WITHOUT DISCRIMINATING AGAINST 
TRANSGENDER STUDENTS. 
That the School Board's privacy argument is a 
pretext for discrimination against transgender 
people is underscored by the ready availability of 
other non-discriminatory means to enhance 
students' privacy. 
To be clear, Title IX does not require schools to 
make privacy-based accommodations. But it bears 
noting that schools can enhance the privacy interests 
of all students, including transgender students, 
through a variety of non-discriminatory measures 
and have done so for years. For example, while a 
school cannot compel a transgender student to use a 
separate restroom, a school may provide separate 
restrooms, where available, for any student who 
wishes not to use the general boys' or girls' 
restrooms. Schools may also accommodate students 
by, for example, providing curtains or ensuring that 
there are sufficient enclosed stalls in the restrooms. 
See, e.g., U.S. Department of Education, Examples of 
Policies and Emerging Practices for Supporting 
Transgender Students 7-8 (May 2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oese/oshs/emer 
gingpractices.pdf. These non-discriminatory and 
non-stigmatizing accommodations would be 
consistent with Title IX and Virginias teaching that 
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any asserted privacy interests must be 
accommodated in a way that does not exclude people 
from educational opportunity. See, e.g., Virginia, 
518 U.S. at 550 n.19, 555 n. 20, 557-58. 
In addition, the School Board implies, as the 
dissenting judge below expressly stated, that the 
privacy interest of students in restrooms is linked to 
the importance of preventing "sexual responses 
prompted by students' exposure to the private body 
parts of students of the other biological sex." Pet. 
App. 52a. By this logic, lesbian students could be 
excluded from girls' bathrooms and gay male 
students could be excluded from boys' restrooms. 
Surely no court or community would countenance 
these unprincipled exclusions. 
Instead, the law properly focuses on misconduct, 
which is the predicate for state statutory and 
common law tort remedies in cases involving 
intentional and ''highly offensive" conduct between 
private citizens. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 
652 (1977). While the "invasion of privacy" tort does 
not provide a general privacy right that justifies 
discrimination, it provides a remedy to any student 
who experiences intrusive, invasive, or other 
offensive conduct in school restrooms. Similarly, in 
cases involving egregious invasions of privacy, such 
as voyeurism or exhibitionism, state criminal law 
punishes such conduct. See, e.g., National District 
Attorneys Association, NDAA Voyeurism 
Compilation (July 2010), 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdfNoyeurism%202010.pdf 
(compiling state "peeping tom" statutes). 
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Schools also have an obligation under Title IX to 
prevent and address peer-on-peer sexual 
harassment, including peer sexual harassment that 
occurs in restrooms, and can be liable for damages 
by failing to respond to severe and pervasive peer 
harassment. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 
U.S. 629, 646-4 7 (1999) ("[Schools] may be liable for 
subjecting their students to discrimination where 
the [school] is deliberately indifferent to known acts 
of student-on-student sexual harassment and the 
harasser is under the school's disciplinary 
authority." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In 
other words, schools are already required to ensure 
that no student-transgender or otherwise-is 
subjected to sexual harassment, which would 
encompass the hypothetical concerns identified by 
the School Board and its amici in school restrooms. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, amici urge this Court 
to affirm the decision below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JENNIFER L. LEVI 
GLBTQLEGAL 
ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS 
30 Winter Street, Suite 800 
BOSTON, MA 02108 
(617) 426-1350 
SHANNON P. MINTER 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
LESBIAN RIGHTS 
870 Market Street, Suite 370 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 392-6257 
DEAN RICHLIN 
Counsel of Record 
AMANDA HAINSWORTH 
RACHEL HUTCHINSON 
EMILY J. NASH 
FOLEY HOAG LLP 
155 Seaport Boulevard 
Boston, MA 02210 
(617) 832-1000 
drichlin@foley hoag .com 
